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Abstract 
By using individual level panel data from 1995 to 1997, and running models with 
individual fixed effect and year fixed effect, the author concludes that there is no valid 
evidence that increase in women labor force participation can lead to rise of 
probability of getting divorced. Furthermore, this effect is heterogeneous among 
different education levels. Empirical results also find out that having high school 
degree has positive effect on the probability of getting divorced, while having college 
degree, income and number of children inthe family all have negative effect. Based on 
these results, measures which can increase women’s college education rate can help 
lower divorce rate.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
Does increased women’s labor force participation result in increased divorces or does 
an increased probability of divorce cause more women to diversify their risk and 
invest more time and skills in the labor market (Kesselring and Bremmer, 2008)? This 
is an interesting topic that has drawn much attention but has not been fully solved yet.  
 
Many economists have made great efforts in shedding light on one direction of the 
question, namely the effect of potential divorce on women’s labor force participation. 
However, few works have been focused on the influence of the opposite direction. It 
is reasonable to argue that increased women’s labor force participation results in less 
time allocated to family, a rise of women’s status inside the family and potentially 
more disputes with husbands. As a result, it is important to test whether a rise in 
women’s labor force participation increases the likelihood of divorce. 
 
In this paper, the author will test the hypothesis that participating in the labor force 
increases the probability of getting divorced for women. Section 2 presents previous 
literature on this topic; section 3 describes the data used, and displays summary 
statistics in tables and graphs; section 4 presents the econometric models to be 
estimated; section 5 conducts empirical analysis; and section 6 summarizes the whole 
paper.  
 
Section 2: Literature Review 
Many previous literatures tried to explain the change in women’s labor participation 
from the perspective of divorce risk and divorce law. Using human capital as an 
explanation, Parkman (1992) found that introduction of unilateral divorce (no-fault 
based divorce) has increased the LFPR of married women. South (1985) found a 
small but direct relationship between unemployment rates (i.e. business cycle) and 
divorce rate. Shapiro and Shaw (1983) found out that women increase their labor 
force participation prior to dissolution of a marriage.  
 
Some previous literatures focused on the same topic and yielded illuminating results. 
Smith (1997) found that a higher divorce rate was caused by increasing women’s 
labor force participation and rising female income. He also found that having fewer 
children resulted from fertility control had an impact on the divorce rate increase.  
 
Similarly, Bremmer and Kesselring (1999, 2004) have investigated in this issue in 
three papers in 1999 and 2004. They used macro data, Granger causality test and 
cointegration techniques and concluded that women’s labor force participation led to 
an increase in the divorce rate. Many papers compare the impact for different 
subgroups of women, such as women with and without children, black women and 
women as a whole group. This is also worth trying.  
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Section 3: Data 
I use the data from PSIDbetween 1995 and 1997, which is individual level panel data. 
I drop the observations which do not have a family indicator since I cannot get the 
variables in family dataset for these individuals. The variable definitions can be found 
in table 1. 
 
The dependent variable in this model is change in marital status, and the whole 
definition of it can be found in table 2. Since the model is focused on estimating the 
effect of being employed on the probability of getting divorced, so the interested 
sample only consists of those who are married in previous year (i.e. those who are 
unmarried in previous year should be excluded from the sample). It is also clear that 
the gender of individuals in the sample can only be female. Based on the two 
restrictions above, the number of observations is 17,584. What is also worth 
mentioning is that we are having an unbalanced panel dataset.  
 
The summary statistics for the variables (table 3) can be found below. There are 575 
out of 17584 observations which have marital status changed from married to 
divorced, and the percentage of this part is 3.27%. 41% of the sample have been 
employed, which a fairly large proportion. The average yearly family taxable income 
is $54,580, with a large standard deviation implying that the distribution is spread out. 
The average number of children in the family is 1.57, and we can find that the 
majority of the families in the sample have less than 3 children. In terms of education 
status, 42% of the sample has high school degree as their highest education earned, 
while 15% of the sample has college or higher degree.  
 
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix for all the variables in the model.The signs for 
the correlation of div with employ, income, hs and col are negative, which gives 
interesting intuition. The sign for the correlation of div with children is positive, 
which is contrary to common sense. There does not exist multicollinearity because all 
the correlation coefficients are below 0.5.  
 
Another interesting way to get more information about the data is to draw graphs 
based on comparison. Figure 1 contains three graphs, comparing many characteristics 
between those who get divorced and those who do not. We can see that on average, 
divorced female have lower employment rate, lower degree earned and considerably 
lower family income. The number of children inside the family is almost the same for 
the two groups.  
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Section 4: Model 
The dependent variable in the model is a dummy variable, divit, which equals one if 
individual i is married in year t-1 but is divorced in year t. This reflects the change in 
the marital status. The main independent variable we are interested in is employit, 
which refers to whether individual i is employed in year t. Control variables include 
hs, col (refers to highest degree earned), income (husband and wife yearly taxable 
income) and children (number of children in family), which is also what is included in 
vector Xitin the model. Two dummies variables, hs and col, are introduced in order to 
test the heterogeneous effect of being employed on probability of getting divorced.  
 
My model is:  
0 1 2 3model 1: * * * *it it it it it i t itdiv employ hs col X u v              
0 1 2 3 4
5
model 2 : * * * l * *
* * *
it it it it it it
it it it i t it
div employ hs co employ hs
employ col X u v
    
  
    
    
0 1model 3: * *  (tentative)it it it i t itdiv hours X u v          
 
It is worth mentioning that model 1 is estimated on samples that are married in 
previous year, because the labor market behavior of those who are married and those 
who are not differs significantly in many aspects. Another reason to rule out 
unmarried people is that divit for them is always 0.  
 
The author hypothesizes that being employed has a positive effect on the probability 
of getting divorced, this is because employment reduces the time spent with family, 
increases the status of women in the family and is likely to increase disputes between 
couples. The effect of education level on the probability of getting divorced is hard to 
predict since there are a lot of factors working on both directions. But testing the 
existence and direction of this effect is important in that it reveals great insight of 
divorce decisions.  
 
What’s more, the sign of coefficient for income is also hard to predict, because in one 
direction, lower income and regular changes of marriage are often seen happening 
together, but in the other direction, higher income could raise economic dependency 
of female and leads to more divorce in turn. Number of children is predicted to have a 
negative relationship with probability of getting divorced, as responsibilities coming 
with raising children could make the cost of divorce higher.  
 
Model 2 incorporates two interaction terms, namely employ*hsandemploy*col. The 
coefficients have the following interpretations: on average and ceteris paribus, the 
difference of the effect of being employed on the probability of getting divorced, 
between married female with highest degree earned as high school (college) and those 
 4 
 
who have not finished high school. The sign for these two interaction terms is 
undetermined.  
 
From model 1, we will get the sign of estimated coefficient of employ and test 
whether it is statistically different from 0. From model 2, we can test whether this 
impact is heterogeneous among different education level, namely high school degree 
and college degree.  
 
This model cannot be used to estimate the causal impact because increased risk of 
getting divorced also increases women labor force participation, which has already 
been proved by previous research. Thereverse causality problem is not solved in this 
model. But this paper will shed light on the correlation problem.  
 
Section 5: Empirical Analysis 
1. Employment  
Regression results and economic significance level are listed in table 5 and 6. The 
main hypothesis is that being employed increases the probability of getting divorced. 
However, the estimated coefficient for employ in model 1 is negative, implying that 
being employed has a lower 0.0009 probability of getting divorced on average and 
holding other variables fixed. It is neither statistically nor economically significant. In 
model 2, being employed has a higher 0.0033 probability of getting divorced on 
average and holding other things equal. However, this is also not economically 
significant.  
 
When taking into account the two interaction terms, employ_hs is estimated to be 
0.0035, meaning that employed female with high school degree has a higher 0.0035 
probability of getting divorced than their counterpart without high school degree. This 
is neither statistically nor economically significant. As to employ_col, it is estimated 
to be -0.0362, meaning that employed female with college degree has a lower 0.0362 
probability of getting divorced than those without high school degree. It is worth 
mentioning that it is significant at 5% significance level. We can conclude that the 
influence of being employed on the probability of getting divorced is heterogeneous 
among different education levels.  
 
The insignificance of the coefficient may be due to omitted variable bias, because 
employment status is correlated with race, and race has non-trivial effect on 
probability of getting divorced. So omitted race in the model could be the reason why 
employ is not significant. However, the author thinks multicollinearity is not the 
potential reason for insignificance.  
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2. Education levels 
From previous analysis, the effect of employment on the probability of getting 
divorced is heterogeneous among different education levels. Next we want to look at 
the direct effect of education levels on the probability of getting divorced.  
 
The effect is hard to estimate theoretically in that higher education level can not only 
lead to factors that increases the probability of getting divorced (such as rise of 
women’s status inside the family, pursuit of better partner, financial independence 
etc.), but can lead to factors that decreases the probability of getting divorced as well 
(such as stability of family financial conditions, better living standards, increased 
identity recognition between couples, similar interests and hobbies, potentially fewer 
working hours in general etc.). The contradictory forces make it difficult to estimate 
the effect. In the following analysis, we use “pro-force” and “con-force” to refer to 
these two forces.  
 
Model 1 and model 2 reveals interesting and consistent results about this relationship. 
Both models report having high school degree increases the probability of getting 
divorced compared with those without high school degree, and the semi-elasticity 
ranges from 0.54 to 0.66. What’s more, both models report having college degree 
decreases the probability of getting divorced compared with the same base group, and 
the semi-elasticity ranges from -1.48 to -0.87. In all, we can conclude that “pro-force” 
outweigh “con-force” as to high school, but “con-force” outweigh “pro-force” when 
female has college or even higher degree.  
 
3. Income 
In section 3, multiple reasons are listed as to why the sign of coefficient for income is 
undetermined. From both models, the estimated coefficient for income is -0.0006, and 
it is significant at 1% significance level. A $1,000 increase of yearly family taxable 
income will lower the probability of getting divorced by 0.6%, on average and ceteris 
paribus. The elasticity for income is -1.09, which is very high.  
 
4. Number of children in the family 
In the hypothesis, we estimate the coefficient for number of children in the family to 
be negative, because it raises the potential cost of divorce. Both models correspond 
with this prediction by getting the estimated coefficient to be -0.0289, which is 
significant at 1% significance level. The elasticity is -0.96, and it is also very high.  
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Section 6: Conclusion 
Using panel data from PSID and running models with individual fixed effect and year 
fixed effect, we can draw the following conclusions:  
(1) There is no valid evidence that increase in women labor force participation can 
lead to the rise of probability of getting divorced. Further test of interaction terms 
confirms that the effect of being employed on the probability of getting divorced 
is heterogeneous among different education levels, namely high school and 
college.  
(2) Education levels have significant effect on the probability of getting divorced: 
having high school degree increases the probability of getting divorced compared 
with those without high school degree, while having college degree decreases the 
probability.  
(3) Income has significant negative effect on the probability of getting divorced: a 
$1,000 increase of yearly family taxable income will lower the probability of 
getting divorced by 0.6%, on average and ceteris paribus.  
(4) Number of children in the family also has significant negative effect on the 
probability of getting divorced: having 1 more children decreases the probability 
of getting divorced by 0.0289, on average and holding other variables fixed.  
 
From these results, we can find that college degree has negative effect on the 
probability of getting divorced, both directly and indirectly through employment. So 
increasing the amount of females who receive college education could be an effective 
way to lower divorce rate. The measures such as more gender equality in recruitment, 
higher financial aid to students from low income families could thus be promoted.  
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Appendix 1: Tables and graphs 
 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
div 1 if changing from married to divorced, 0 otherwise 
employ 1 if being employed, 0 otherwise 
income Husband and wife taxable income, in $1,000s 
children Number of children in family 
hs 1 if the highest degree earned is high school, 0 otherwise 
col 1 if the highest degree earned is college, 0 otherwise 
 
Table 2: Definition of Change in Marital Status 
Code Description 
1 head and Wife/"Wife" or head and husband of head remained married to each other 
2 head remained unmarried (single, separated, widowed, divorced) 
3 head and Wife/"Wife" or head and husband of head were married in previous year, head is 
one of these two individuals and divorced or separated in this year 
4 head and Wife/"Wife" or head and husband of head were married in previous year, head is 
one of these two individuals and is widowed in this year 
5 head was unmarried (i.e. no spouse present) in previous year but was married in this year and 
has either stayed head or become Wife/"Wife" or husband of head 
6 head and Wife/"Wife" or head and husband of head were married in previous year, became 
divorced and married someone in this year 
7 head and Wife/"Wife" or head and husband of head were married in previous year, became 
widowed and remarried in this year 
8 Other, including all splitoffs except those who were either Head or Wife/"Wife" in previous 
year; recontact family 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
variable mean p50 sd min max 
div 0.03 0 0.18 0 1 
employ 0.41 0 0.49 0 1 
income 54.58 44.5 57.25 -128.56 1034.93 
children 1.57 2 1.37 0 9 
hs 0.42 0 0.49 0 1 
col 0.15 0 0.35 0 1 
Count: 17,584 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
div employ income children hs col 
div 1 
     
employ -0.0146 1 
    
income -0.1177 0.1019 1 
   
children 0.0007 -0.2165 0.008 1 
  
hs -0.0131 0.4161 -0.0955 -0.2562 1 
 
col -0.0229 0.265 0.2042 -0.1193 -0.3501 1 
 
 
Table 5: Regression Results 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
employ -0.0009 0.0033 
(0.005577) (0.011623) 
hs 0.0199* 0.0163 
(0.010932) (0.011679) 
col -0.0445** -0.0262 
(0.020607) (0.021797) 
employ_hs 0.0035 
(0.013397) 
employ_col -0.0362** 
(0.017540) 
income -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
(0.000046) (0.000046) 
children -0.0289*** -0.0289*** 
(0.003510) (0.003511) 
96.year 0.0214*** 0.0213*** 
(0.002592) (0.002592) 
97.year 0.0433*** 0.0432*** 
(0.002646) (0.002647) 
Constant 0.0884*** 0.0886*** 
(0.009317) (0.009376) 
Observations 17,584 17,584 
R-squared 0.045 0.046 
Number of id 6,440 6,440 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Comparison with Hypothesis, and Economic Significance 
 
hypothesis model 1 model 2 
employ positive -0.03 0.11 
hs undetermined 0.66 0.54 
col undetermined -1.48 -0.87 
income undetermined -1.09 -1.09 
children negative -0.96 -0.96 
Note: the displayed economic significance is elasticity for income, 
and semi-elasticity for all other variables.  
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison between divorced and undivorced female 
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Appendix 2:  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      name:  <unnamed> 
       log:  E:\202 Econometrics\Break ice\Data\paper.smcl 
  log type:  smcl 
 opened on:   1 May 2017, 00:01:18 
. *============================ 
. * final changes to panel data 
. *============================ 
. drop if sex==1 //drop male 
(25,476 observations deleted) 
 
. drop if change==2| change==5| change==8 //drop unmarried 
(10,313 observations deleted) 
 
. gen div = 0 
. replace div = 1 if change==3|change==6 
(575 real changes made) 
. label var div "married to divorce" 
 
. gen employ = 0 
. replace employ =1 if employment==1|employment==2 
(7,263 real changes made) 
. label var employ "being employed" 
 
. replace income = income/1000 
variable income was long now double 
(16,894 real changes made) 
. label var income "income in $1000" 
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. gen hs = 0 
. replace hs = 1 if education>=12 & education<=15 
(7,317 real changes made) 
 
. gen col = 0 
. replace col = 1 if education>=16 
(2,581 real changes made) 
. 
. *============================ 
. * data description 
. *============================ 
. tabstat div employ income children hs col, stat(mean median sd min max) /// 
>         col(stat) format(%8.2f) 
    variable |      mean       p50        sd       min       max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
         div |      0.03      0.00      0.18      0.00      1.00 
      employ |      0.41      0.00      0.49      0.00      1.00 
      income |     54.58     44.50     57.25   -128.56   1034.93 
    children |      1.57      2.00      1.37      0.00      9.00 
hs |      0.42      0.00      0.49      0.00      1.00 
         col |      0.15      0.00      0.35      0.00      1.00 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
.  
. graph bar (mean) employ hs col, over (div) /// 
>title("Comparison of binary variable") /// 
>subtitle("by change of marital status") /// 
>saving(1)  
(file 1.gph saved) 
. graph bar (mean) children, over (div) /// 
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>title("Comparison of number of children") /// 
>subtitle("by change of marital status") /// 
>saving(2) 
(file 2.gph saved) 
 
. graph bar (mean) income, over (div) /// 
>title("Comparison of yearly family income") /// 
>subtitle("by change of marital status") /// 
>saving(3) 
(file 3.gph saved) 
 
. graph combine 1.gph 2.gph 3.gph, hole(4) saving(comparison) 
(file comparison.gphsaved) 
.          
. cor div employ income children hs col 
(obs=17,584) 
 
             |      div   employ   income children       hs 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
         div |   1.0000 
      employ |  -0.0146   1.0000 
      income |  -0.1177   0.1019   1.0000 
    children |   0.0007  -0.2165   0.0080   1.0000 
hs|  -0.0131   0.4161  -0.0955  -0.2562   1.0000 
         col |  -0.0229   0.2650   0.2042  -0.1193  -0.3501 
 
             |      col 
-------------+--------- 
         col |   1.0000 
. *============================ 
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. * empirical results 
. *============================ 
. xtset id year 
       panel variable:  id (unbalanced) 
        time variable:  year, 95 to 97, but with gaps 
                delta:  1 unit 
 
. xtreg div employ hs col income children i.year, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     17,584 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      6,440 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
within  = 0.0454                                         min =          1 
     between = 0.0017                                         avg =        2.7 
     overall = 0.0058                                         max =          3 
 
F(7,11137)        =      75.61 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3300                        Prob > F          =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         div |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      employ |  -.0008514   .0055768    -0.15   0.879    -.0117829    .0100801 
hs |   .0199466   .0109318     1.82   0.068    -.0014817    .0413749 
         col |  -.0445014   .0206067    -2.16   0.031    -.0848941   -.0041086 
      income |  -.0006097   .0000465   -13.11   0.000    -.0007008   -.0005186 
    children |  -.0288618   .0035104    -8.22   0.000    -.0357427   -.0219808 
             | 
        year | 
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96  |   .0213547   .0025919     8.24   0.000     .0162741    .0264354 
97  |   .0432974    .002646    16.36   0.000     .0381109     .048484 
             | 
       _cons |    .088442   .0093174     9.49   0.000     .0701782    .1067057 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
sigma_u|  .20053792 
sigma_e|  .13721942 
         rho |  .68110276   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0: F(6439, 11137) = 2.79                 Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. outreg2 using table1.xls, replace bdec(4) sdec(6) 
table1.xls 
dir :seeout 
.  
. gen employ_hs = employ * hs 
. gen employ_col = employ * col 
 
. xtreg div employ hs col employ_hsemploy_col income children i.year, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     17,584 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      6,440 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
within  = 0.0460                                         min =          1 
     between = 0.0018                                         avg =        2.7 
     overall = 0.0058                                         max =          3 
 
F(9,11135)        =      59.65 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3373                        Prob > F          =     0.0000 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         div |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      employ |   .0032698   .0116234     0.28   0.778    -.0195142    .0260538 
hs |    .016281    .011679     1.39   0.163    -.0066119    .0391739 
         col |  -.0261601   .0217966    -1.20   0.230    -.0688853    .0165651 
employ_hs |   .0035321   .0133971     0.26   0.792    -.0227286    .0297928 
employ_col|  -.0361875   .0175402    -2.06   0.039    -.0705694   -.0018056 
      income |    -.00061   .0000465   -13.12   0.000    -.0007012   -.0005189 
    children |  -.0288611   .0035107    -8.22   0.000    -.0357427   -.0219795 
             | 
        year | 
96  |   .0212825   .0025919     8.21   0.000      .016202    .0263631 
97  |     .04316   .0026472    16.30   0.000     .0379709     .048349 
             | 
       _cons |   .0885609   .0093755     9.45   0.000     .0701832    .1069386 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
sigma_u|  .20080139 
sigma_e|  .13718672 
         rho |  .68177623   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0: F(6439, 11135) = 2.78                 Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. outreg2 using table1.xls, append bdec(4) sdec(6) 
table1.xls 
dir :seeout 
 
.  
.  
end of do-file 
